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By now a vast literature on social capital exists. Since Putnam’s seminal study on the role of 
social capital in Italian regions (Putnam, 1993), numerous scholars from different disciplines 
have contributed to our understanding of the antecedents and consequences of social capital 
(Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001). Without going into a detailed discussion of 
all existing definitions of social capital (Sobel, 2002; Fine, 2001; Woolcock, 1998), it is 
important to specify how we understand social capital, exactly because of its multiple 
interpretations. We follow Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) who present three main underlying 
ideas that return in almost all of the definitions of social capital; ‘First, social capital 
generates (positive) externalities for members of a group. Second, these externalities are 
achieved through shared trust, norms, and values and their consequent effects on expectations 
and behavior. Third, shared trust, norms and values arise from informal forms of organization 
based on social networks and associations’. Hence, in their view, ‘social capital is the study 
of network based processes that generate beneficial outcomes through norms of trust’ 
(Durlauf and Fafchamps 2004, p. 5).  
Although initially social capital was thought to be a one-dimensional construct that 
produces only positive outcomes, it is by now generally acknowledged that types of social 
capital exist, and that there is a dark side of social capital as well. In this respect Putnam 
(2000) distinguishes between two types of social capital, i.e. bonding and bridging social 
capital. The latter type can be defined as bonds of connectedness that are formed across 
diverse social groups, whereas bonding social capital cements only homogenous groups. A 
similar distinction in types of social capital has been proposed by others (Paxton, 1999; 
Fedderke et al. 1999; Woolcock, 1998), occasionally using different terminology but 
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referring to the same underlying phenomenon. For example, Tabellini (2008) and Platteau 
(1994) distinguish between limited versus generalized morality. 
Despite its conceptual attractiveness, both theoretically and empirically, the (early) 
social capital studies yield a number of problems (Jackman and Miller, 1996; Manski, 2000; 
Paldam and Svendsen, 2000; Boggs, 2001; Fine, 2001; Durlauf, 2002a; Durlauf, 2002b; 
Sobel, 2002; Glaeser, 2000; Beugelsdijk et. al., 2004; Beugelsdijk, 2008). Most of these 
critical approaches concentrate on the lack of a well-developed theoretical framework or 
methodical problems like the endogeneity of social capital. Moreover, there is little 
systematic quantitative evidence (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004) and formal modelling has 
just recently taken off (Tabellini, 2008; Francois, 2002; Alesina and Ferrara, 2000). As 
Bovenberg has put it, ‘theoretical models should be developed that define precisely the 
mechanisms through which various endogenous and exogenous variables interact. 
Subsequently the predictions of these models should be falsified’ (Bovenberg, 2003, p. 417).  
The added value of this paper lies precisely in the formal macroeconomic modelling and the 
empirical testing of the influence of different types of social capital on economic growth.  
In our model, individuals endogenously choose how much time they spend on closed 
networks (bonding social capital) and open networks (bridging social capital), depending on 
their preferences and the opportunity costs (cf. Alesina and Ferrara, 2000). Both networks 
provide opportunities for social interaction, for which individuals have a preference. 
Participation in open networks has the side-effect of protection against opportunistic 
behaviour by others. Each individual also optimally chooses time spent on rent-seeking 
activities, on work and on investment and learning. At the aggregate level, participation in 
open networks (i.e. bridging capital) translates in civic engagement. If the level of civic 
engagement is high in society, opportunistic behaviour becomes less attractive for individuals 
and a more efficient system of exchange stimulates the economy (cf. Tabellini, 2008). We 
 4 
formally link these mechanisms to investment and economic growth and show that more 
bridging social capital may (but need not) go together with faster growth. The reason why 
bridging capital is not necessarily good for growth is that it requires the maintenance of 
networks, which is a time-consuming process and comes at the cost of working time.1 
As in Tabellini (2007), we analyze differences in economic growth rates across a 
sample of 54 European regions for the 1950-1998 period, and use the European Values 
Survey (EVS) to develop measures for our social capital measures. We show that bridging 
social capital has a positive effect on growth, whereas bonding social capital has a negative 
effect on the degree of sociability outside the closed social circle. This result supports 
Fukuyama’s claim that ‘the strength of the family bond implies a certain weakness in ties 
between individuals not related to one another’ (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 56). Moreover, we show 
that an important mechanism that influences the degree to which people are willing to step 
out of their closed social circle and build bridging social capital depends on the materialistic 
attitude of that people. Since social capital is formed through network participation and social 
interaction in groups, it may well arise as a by-product of social interaction that is initiated 
mainly for other reasons. Man simply has a desire for socialising, just like it has a preference 
for food, shelter and material possessions (Simmel, 1908, 1950). Based on classical 
sociological insights, our argument is that there may be a trade-off between satisfying 
materialistic wants and desires for socialising. Materialistic attitudes may thus come at the 
cost of socialising and reduce the accumulation of social capital. People who are more 
materialistic tend to stick to the type of socialising that has a direct payoff, whereas less 
                                                 
1 It is important to note that for atomistic agents any form of social interaction – be it either bridging or bonding 
social capital – yields benefits. The issue is that bridging social capital has a larger (positive) impact on 
economic growth than bonding social capital. Hence, we do not claim that socialising with family and close 
friends is a bad activity as such. The crucial point is the distinction between types of socialising; investing in 
bridging social capital is better from a growth perspective. In this respect Putnam (2000) makes a relevant 
distinction between ‘getting by’ (bonding social capital) and ‘getting ahead’ (bridging social capital). 
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materialistic people are more embedded in social structures that do not directly yield 
materialistic or worldly advantages (Belk, 1984, 1985; Richins and Dawson, 1992).  
Our empirical model closely follows the structure of our theoretical model. By doing 
so, we aim to counter (parts of) the criticism raised by Durlauf (2002b, p. F474) on the 
empirical literature on social capital. He writes that empirical studies seem to be particularly 
plagued by vague definition of concepts, poorly measured data, absence of appropriate 
exchangeability conditions, and lack of information necessary to make identification claims 
possible. Moreover, he argues that these problems are especially important as social capital 
arguments depend on underlying socio-psychological relations that are difficult to quantify, 
let alone measure. Our paper is a first and modest attempt to counter these criticisms. More in 
general, we contribute to the literature on culture and economic development, and the role of 
social capital in specific by showing that it is – both theoretically and empirically - important 
to distinguish between the nature of social interactions. This is an important conclusion as it 
informs the increasingly intense debate in economics on the role of social interactions for 
economic outcomes. 
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. We first present our formal 
model in which we describe the different channels through which the different types of social 
capital affect economic growth and what the role of materialistic attitude is. Then we test our 
set of hypotheses. Using a unique data set on norms and values in a sample of 54 European 
regions, we test the implications of our theoretical model.  
 
2. A Formal Model of Bonding and Bridging Social Capital 
2.1. Individuals’ decision problem 
Individuals live for two periods. They work, consume and engage in social interaction when 
young, and consume when old. They care about produced consumption goods (c when young 
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and co when old) and social interaction2 (s). That is, their utility function has both material 
goods and social aspects as arguments: ( , , )ou U c c s= , with , , 0oc c sU U U > , where subscripts 
to function symbols denote (partial) derivatives.  As argued above, we distinguish between 
two types of networks. First, social interaction takes place with close friends and family 
(which we categorize as f-networks). Second, networks consist of more remote contacts 
outside the family, within and outside the community one lives, in clubs, pubs and public 
meeting places, in voluntary organisations (called v-networks). In Putnam’s (2000) terms, f-
networks and v-networks represent bonding and bridging capital, respectively. Interacting 
with others is possible in both of these networks, so that they are substitutes to a certain 
degree in satisfying the individual’s preference for social interaction. As Fukuyama argues 
‘People are embedded in a variety of social groups – families, neighbourhoods, networks, 
businesses churches, and nations – against whose interests they have to balance their own’ 
(Fukuyama, 1995, p. 21). Hence, on balance the two are substitutes but imperfect ones in the 
utility function, which is reflected in the sub-utility function for satisfaction from social 
interaction (s): ( , )s S f v= , with , 0f vS S > . Here, f and v are the intensity of participation in 
f-networks and v-networks, respectively, to be measured by the time devoted to it.  
Individuals choose how much they consume and how much they engage in social 
interaction. Social interaction (that is, maintaining social capital) requires time, which comes 
at the cost of working time. At the aggregate level this assumption is supported by the 
negative correlation of the number of working hours per year and the time invested in social 
networks (see appendix I). Thus there is a trade-off between social interaction and (future) 
material consumption. Through this channel, social interaction crowds out economic activity, 
so that the social capital created by social interaction has a negative effect on the economy.  
                                                 
2 From now on, when we write social interaction we mean socialising or sociability. In general, social 
interaction can also imply the fighting of a war, whereas socialising implies informal friendly social interaction. 
Nevertheless, in the remainder we restrict social interaction to the process of socialising. 
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To allow for a potential positive effect of social capital on the economy, we assume 
that social interaction in certain networks affects the degree of opportunistic behaviour. The 
idea is that agents engage in (time-consuming) rent seeking activities, by which we mean 
corruption and extorting, shirking and distrusting. By doing so they can effectively extract 
some of the income of others. However, participation in open networks (v) protects agents 
against rent-seeking: people that are in the same open network never rob each other. As an 
example consider a shopkeeper, who is left with some products that are below his normal 
quality standard (say a grocer with some vegetables not so fresh anymore). He could mix 
high-quality goods and low-quality goods and sell all of them as high-quality goods. The 
customers might notice the low quality only when they are at home. But then they do not find 
it worthwhile to return to the shop and complain. The shopkeeper might also refrain from 
selling the low quality goods, or might sell them at a discount with the explicit warning about 
the quality. The shopkeeper is arguably less inclined to cheat his customers, if he knows he 
will meet the customer at another occasion, in particular when socialising with the same 
person.  
The idea is that open networks act like bridging capital in connecting different groups. 
Within these networks, participants build up reputation and show trustworthiness in order to 
be able to derive value from social interaction across the groups represented in the network. 
Thus, while the desire for social interaction is the primary reason to join the network, trust 
and protection against rent-seeking is created as a side-product. 
To be precise, let z be the time devoted to preparing rent-seeking activities. Rent-
seeking implies randomly selecting a number of persons and extracting income from them. 
The most direct interpretation of income extraction is simply theft or robbery. Many more 
indirect interpretations are possible also: shopkeepers may exploit uninformed customers by 
selling goods of inferior quality; workers may cheat employers by shirking; one might think 
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of opportunistic behaviour in general. Obviously, we assume rent-seeking is directed at 
persons outside your own community (i.e. outside the f-network). However, you may run the 
risk that some of your rent-seeking activity affects fellows from your v-network, something 
you can only avoid after you have already spent the time preparing the rent-seeking activities 
(that is after choosing z). We also assume you actually want to avoid damage to fellows from 
your v-networks, because they can exploit the network for some punishment or ostracism 
strategy.  
On average a fraction ( )B z  of the average wage of a person you target can be 
extracted. However, only persons with whom one has no ties through v-networks will be 
eventually robbed, so the expected net benefit is (1 ) ( )v B z w− , where w  denotes the average 
wage and [0,1]v ∈  represents the probability that you meet somebody from your own v-
network. 
Rents extracted from others amount to positive transfers to you. However, rents being 
extracted from you amount to negative transfers. The latter are higher, the higher is your 
wage, the more rent-seeking prevails in society and the smaller is the number of fellows in 
your v-network who will abstain from robbing you. These (gross) negative transfers can be 
expressed as (1 ) ( )v D z w− , where ( )D z  is the damage from being robbed per unit of wage 
income as a function of rentseeking activity, and de bar denotes the average level in society. 
Thus, net transfers are (1 )[ ( ) ( ) ]v B z w D z w− − , with  0, 0z zB D> > . 
Finally we assume that agents can invest in production skills when young. Their wage 
income, w, depends positively on the amount of time spent learning, l. Hence, we may write 
( )w W l= , with 0lW > . 
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Since social interaction, rent seeking, and learning are time-consuming activities, they 
come at the cost of time devoted to work. With total time endowment normalized to unity, 
total time available for work equals (1 )v f z l− − − − . 
We can now write down the complete decision problem of the individual agent. 
Choosing specifications for the utility functions and learning functions, we write:  
 
 maximize  ( , , ) (ln ln ) lno ou U c c s c c s= = µ + δ + ,    (1) 
 
 subject to  ( ) /( 1)1/ ( 1) / ( 1) /( , )s S f v f v σ σ−σ σ− σ σ− σ= = φ + ,    (2) 
 
(1 ) (1 )[ ( ) ( ) ]
1
occ v f z l w v B z w D z w
r
+ = − − − − + − −
+
.  (3) 
 
( ) lhw W l w e
ψ= =        (4) 
 
We specify utility U as a time-separable Cobb-Douglas utility function. The importance of 
material consumption relative to social interaction is parameterized by µ  and will be referred 
to as the materialism preference parameter. The utility discount factor is δ < 1. For sub-utility 
S(v,f), we assume a constant elasticity of substitution σ between the two types of social 
networks. The importance of f-networks relative to v-networks is captured by parameter φ , 
which will be referred to as the family ties preference parameter. The third line is the 
intertemporal budget constraint: net present value of consumption equals income from work 
plus net benefits from rent seeking. Finally, the learning function is exponential (consistent 
with Mincer’s (1974) classical results) with  denoting the returns to learning. In particular, 
leψ  can be interpreted as the skill level and wh as the wage per unit of skills. Since we model 
only one type of investment in “traditional” (non-social) capital, we interpret  more 
generally as the productivity of (non-social) investment.  
The individual takes as given the average wage and loss from rent seeking in society 




 (1 ) ( )zv B z w w− = ,        (5) 
 
 
( , ; )
1 ( ) ( )
( , ; )
v
f
S f v w
D z B z
S f v w
φ
φ
 = − −  




( , ; )( , ; ) fS f vS f v
c w
φµ φ = ,       (7) 
 (1 )oc r c= δ + ,         (8) 
[(1 )(1 ( )) ]l lh he w v D z f z l e w
ψ ψψ − − − − − = .     (9) 
 
Equation (5) is the condition for optimal rent-seeking: it states that the marginal benefits of 
rent-seeking (marginal expected gross transfers, left-hand side) should equal the marginal 
opportunity cost (the wage on foregone labour time, right-hand side). Equation (6) determines 
the optimal trade-off between the two types of network interaction. The left-hand side 
represents the amount of time devoted to v-networks an individual is maximally willing to 
give up in exchange for an additional unit of time devoted to v-network participation 
(marginal rate of substitution). The right-hand side gives the opportunity cost of engaging in 
f-network participation rather than in f-network participation (marginal rate of 
transformation). Spending time with friends has a relatively low cost compared to spending 
time in extra-community networks if the net loss from rent-seeking (term in brackets) is high. 
Equation (7) determines the optimal trade-off between the material consumption and social 
interaction in f-networks: the benefits from additional family time, /s f fU S S s= , should 
equal the opportunity costs in terms of foregone income that can be spend on consumption 
goods, /cU w w cµ= . Equation (8) is the well-known Euler equation for consumption: 
consumption increases over time with the rate of return on savings, r, and the degree of 
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patience as measured by the discount factor δ. Finally, equation (9) characterizes optimal 
investment in human capital by equating marginal benefits and costs of learning. As shown at 
the left-hand side, learning raises human capital by leψψ  units, which increases earnings at 
wage rate hw  for each unit of time that human capital is employed (the term in brackets 
represents this working time). The right-hand side represents the marginal costs of learning, 
which consist of wages forgone because learning time comes at the cost of working time.  
 
2.2. Solving for investment in production skills and social capital 
The decisions of the individual agent depend on the society-wide variables like average rent-
seeking, which in turn depend on the decisions of others. To solve for the macro-economic 
levels of the variables, we employ the simple assumption of complete symmetry: all agents 
have the same preferences and income and will make the same choices. Hence we have 
 
 , ( ) ( )w w D z D z= = .        (10) 
 
We assume that if all agents engage in the same intensity of rent-seeking, the losses are a 
constant factor 1+ ζ  larger than the benefits:  
 
 ( ) (1 ) ( )D z B z= + ζ ,   0ζ > .      (11) 
 
Thus rent-seeking is a negative sum game: what the extorter gains, is less than the damage to 
the person being extorted. Part of the transfer may be lost “in the battle” or confiscated by 
authorities. One might also see this as an implicit way of modelling the costs that the victim 
has to incur to avoid cheating and shirking (monitoring costs). Parameter ζ  captures this 
externality cost of rent-seeking.3 
                                                 
3 We think that it is realistic to add this negative externality. However, all our qualitative results go through 
when ζ=0. 
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Our main question in this subsection is how investment in production skills (l) and 
bridging social capital (v) are related. Note that both variables are endogenous. Therefore, we 
need to identify how variations in exogenous variables simultaneously affect economic 
performance and social capital. The exogenous driving forces in the model are investment 
productivity (), preference for family-and-friends ties ( φ ), and preference for material 
consumption (materialism µ ). We reduce the model to two equations in terms of the 
endogenous variables l and v and the exogenous variables , ,ψ φ µ .  
First, we denote by Z(v) the privately optimal level of rent seeking, as a negative 
function of v-networks, which follows from (5) after substitution of (10):  
 
( )z Z v= ,    0vZ < .    (12) 
 
Substituting (12) and (11) into (6), we find that f is a positive function of v and φ:  
 
( ; )f F v= φ ,    , 0vF Fφ > .    (13) 
 
Solving (9) for l and substituting (10)-(13), we find desired learning time as a function 
of v and exogenous variables:  
 
[1 ( ; ) ( ) (1 ) ( ( ))] 1/
( ; , ) , 0, 0,
l v F v Z v v D Z v
L v L Lφ ψ
= − − φ − − − − ψ
≡ φ ψ < >
 (14) 
 
This key result reveals that networks have an impact on investment in production 
skills (l) through five channels (corresponding to the five places where v shows up in the 
equation). First, more social interaction in v-networks directly reduces labour time and hence 
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reduces the returns to investment in production skills (see second term in brackets). Second, 
different types of social networking are positively correlated, so an increase in v-networking 
also increases time spent with friends and family and further reduces working time (third 
term in brackets). Together, we call these effects the labour time crowding out effect. The 
other three effects stem from the fact that v-capital protects against rent-seeking. In more 
dense social networks, there is less rent-seeking, so that not only time is freed up for 
production (fourth term in brackets, recall that Z depends negatively on v), but also the 
negative sum externality is smaller (through lower probability that non-members meet and 
rob each other and through the smaller rent-seeking effort z). Whether the returns to 
investment in production skills is positively or negatively related with v-networks thus 
depends on whether the negative labour time crowding out effect dominates or not the 
positive protection against rent-seeking effect (see appendix II, equation (A.10)).  
Equation (14) also reveals that materialism (µ ) has no direct impact on the economy, 
but can have an indirect impact only through affecting v. We substitute all first-order 
conditions into the budget constraint to solve for v. In particular, substituting first-order 
conditions (7)-(9) and (12)-(13) into the budget constraint (3) to eliminate z, f, l, co, and c, we 
find: 
 
( ( ; ), )
(1 ) [1/ (1 ) ( ( ))]
( ( ; ), )
fS F v v v B Z v




+ = + − .    (15) 
This is an implicit function in v only, so we may write (if we assume a unique solution): 
 
 ( , , )v V φ µ ψ= ,    , , 0V V Vφ µ ψ < .   (16) 
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Equations (14) and (16) solve for equilibrium values of bridging capital v and learning time l. 
In appendix II we prove that v decreases with φ, µ, and , and that l increases with  while 
the effect of a rise in  or φ  is ambiguous.  
We illustrate the working of our model by showing the effects of an increase in the 
materialism preference parameter (µ), which is a key determinant in our analysis. More 
materialistic attitudes reduce time engaged in bridging networks, see (16). Whether this 
increases or decreases investment in production skills depends on the sign of Lv in (14). If the 
“labour time crowding out effect” dominates, the sign is negative; then investment rises when 
and bridging social capital falls when attitudes become more materialistic. The opposite 
happens when the “protection against rent-seeking effect” dominates; Lv is positive and both 
investment and social capital fall with more materialistic attitudes. Hence, materialism affects 
investment in the economy (as measured by a change in l) through a change in voluntary 
organizations (according to the relationship between v and l in (14)), but whether it boosts or 
hurt the economy depends on the relative strength of the crowding-out effect and protection-
against-rent-seeking effect. 
Analyzing changes in the other parameters in a similar way (and resorting to the 
mathematics in appendix II to make results more precise), we find the comparative statics 
displayed in Table 1. For example, a rise in the family ties preference parameter (φ) reduces 
bridging social capital (as measured by v, see the minus signs in the fourth column), and may 







Table 1: Comparative statics  
 Materialism (µ ) Family ties ( φ ) Investment 
productivity ( ψ ) 
 




( 0Lvε < )
* 




( 0 Lv< ε )
*  
– – – – + – 
* See appendix II for exact solutions. 
 
2.3 Firms and regional output growth 
Aggregate production in a region (Y) is a Cobb-Douglas function of physical capital (K), 
effective labor input (H), and technology (A), 1Y AK Hβ −β= . Firms produce under perfect 
competition. Physical capital is regionally mobile so that the supply of capital is perfectly 
elastic at the exogenously given international interest rate r. This implies that wages equal 
(1 ) /hw Y Hβ= − and that aggregate regional output can be written as:
4  
 
 /(1 ) 1/(1 )( / )Y r A Hβ −β −β= β ,       (17) 
 
Hence, growth in the technology level (A) and effective labor input (H) drives output growth.  
The effective labor supply equals the labor time adjusted for their production skills (or 
human capital). Each agent supplies (1 ) lv f z eψ− − −  units of (effective) labor at the wage 
hw , but (1 ) ( )
lv B z eψζ−  units ultimately do not result in regional output, because they get lost 
                                                 
4 We derive this result as follows. From the demand for capital, 1 1A K H rβ− −ββ = , we can solve for K. We 
substitute this solution into the production function to arrive at (17).  
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in the process of rent seeking.5 Aggregate effective labor input is therefore (where N is the 
number of agents, or population size): 
 
 [(1 )(1 ) ] lH N v B f z eψ= ⋅ − − ζ − − ⋅ .      (18) 
 
 
The level of technology a country can exploit (A) results from technological 
innovation and absorption of foreign technologies. As in Nelson and Phelps (1966, cf. Bils 
and Klenow, 2000), a larger level of human capital per worker facilitates the absorption of 
foreign technologies. We choose the following specification for technological change:6 
 
 ln / ln( / )d A dt A A l= α + λψ ,      (19) 
 
where A  is the level of technology in the rest of the world from which a region can learn. 
The first term captures convergence through catching-up. Regions with relatively large 
technology gaps with other regions, /A A , benefit from a relatively large pool of 
technologies to absorb from other regions, they realize relatively fast technical change until 
most technologies are absorbed and technological change slows down. The second term 
indicates that a region’s productivity gap converges to a level that depends positively on the 
level of human capital.7  
 Growth of per capita output can now be calculated from (17), (18) and (19) as: 
 
 ln( / ) ln ln(1 )
1y
g Y H y v f z l
  λ= α − α + α − − − + α + ψ 	 
−β  
,  (20) 
                                                 
5 We do not subtract learning time. Thus we integrate the learning sector (education, training and consultancy) 
in our measure of output Y.  
6 Although our model relies on a specific way of modeling growth through technical change and human capital 
accumulation (Bils and Klenow, 2000, who build on Nelson and Phelps, 1966; and Mincer, 1974), the results 
carry over to other standard growth frameworks (e.g. Lucas, 1988; Rebelo, 1991). The time crowding out effect 
implies lower utilization of any kind of capital (or input) in the economic production process (for example 
physical capital, human capital). This reduces the incentives to invest in these capital goods (or inputs). 
Protection against rent seeking implies that the returns from investment can be better appropriated and thus 
stimulates investment and growth. 




where per capita output is denoted by /y Y N≡ , where we have used (17) to eliminate /A A  
and /Y H is the average income per unit of human capital in rest of the world.8 We can 
identify the driving forces behind growth by the three terms at the right-hand side of equation 
(20): foreign income levels, own income levels, and the term in brackets, which can be 
written in terms of social capital v and the parameters φ and ψ  only (see (11)-(14)). The first 
term captures spillover effect: rich neighboring regions provide a region with the 
opportunities to learn from and grow faster. The second term captures beta-convergence: 
poor countries grow faster than rich countries, ceteris paribus, due to technological catch-up. 
The third term at the right-hand side of (20) captures the effect of social capital on growth. 
Note that the sign is ambiguous because the labor time allocation effect may or may not be 
dominated by the protection against rent-seeking effect. Also the effect of ψ  is ambiguous: 
on the one hand a higher productivity of learning enhances human capital, on the other hand 
it reduces hours worked. 
 
2.4 Implications from the model 
In the theoretical model, the following results have been derived about the relationship 
between growth and social interaction. 
• Growth and bridging social capital are endogenous variables, which are 
simultaneously determined by attitudes towards spending time with friends and 
family, materialism, and the productivity of investment.  
• Controlling for family ties, initial income, and productivity of investment, an 
exogenous increase in bridging social capital may affect growth negatively or 
                                                 
8 We have also used the fact that l, v, f, and z are constant over time according to the model. When testing the 
model, these terms are expected to be relatively small. Moreover, no time series data is available for these 
variables. 
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positively. In the former case, the time cost of networking dominates the productive 
benefits. The latter case arises if the protection of bridging capital against rent-seeking 
is strong enough (see equations (20) and (14)). 
• Materialism affects growth only through bridging social capital. Interesting to note is 
that materialism may be good or bad for growth. In particular, if the protection against 
rent-seeking effect dominates, more materialism leads to lower bridging capital and 
thus to lower growth. 
• Family ties, investment and materialism negatively affect bridging capital. Initial 
income does not affect bridging capital (see (16)).    
 
3. An Empirical Test of Our Hypotheses 
3.1 Measurement 
In order to test the above hypotheses we investigate growth rates across 54 European regions. 
By taking regions, we are able to test if Putnam’s thesis on social capital based on Italian 
regions can be generalized (Putnam, 1993, Tabellini, 2007). Moreover, a European regional 
approach allows us to incorporate Temple’s critical comment (1999) that countries differing 
widely in social, political and institutional characteristics are unlikely to fall on a common 
surface. Most important, however, is the fact that by comparing national cultures, ‘we risk 
losing track of the enormous diversity found within many of the major nations of the world’ 
(Smith and Bond 1998, 41). By studying regions and regional differences this risk is limited. 
Data on social capital are taken from the European Value Studies (EVS), which is a 
survey on norms and values. The European Value Study is a large-scale, cross-national, and 
longitudinal survey research program on basic human values, initiated by the European Value 
Systems Study Group (EVSSG) in the late 1970s. The EVS aimed at designing and 
conducting a major empirical study of the moral and social values underlying European 
social and political institutions and governing conduct. Of the three survey waves (1981, 
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1990, and 1999) we use the second one. For reasons of availability of social capital variables 
and the possibility of a regional breakdown we are not able to use the other waves. The set 
comprises 7 countries, i.e. France, Italy, Germany, Spain, The Netherlands, Belgium, and the 
United Kingdom. Our regional approach implies that France consists of 8 regions, Italy 11, 
Germany 11 (former eastern regions excluded), Spain 7, The Netherlands 4, Belgium 3, and 
the UK 10 (including Scotland, excluding Northern Ireland). The total number of regions 
equals 54. This regional classification is based on the European Statistical Office (Eurostat), 
as are our economic data. 
 
A basic empirical regional growth model 
In crafting our empirical model, we follow Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) who explain 
regional growth differentials in Europe between 1950 and 1990. As we have more recent 
economic data, we analyze the period 1950-1998.9 To test the growth part of our theoretical 
model, we use their standard growth framework, in which economic growth is explained by a 
number of key economic variables (Baumol, 1986; Barro, 1991; Mankiw et. al., 1992; Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). We include initial per capita income of the region. Our proxies for 
the productivity of investment are educational attainment and national investment rates. Since 
regional investment rates are not available, we take the national rates from the Penn World 
Tables.10 Further, the idea is that years of schooling facilitate learning on the job (which was 
theoretically modeled by variable l). Regional schooling data is only available for a limited 
number of years, and measured by the total number of pupils at first and second level in 
1977, divided by total number of people in the corresponding age group. The school 
enrolment rate in 1977 falls in between these dates and given the fact that school enrolment 
                                                 
9 For reasons of robustness, we also observed shorter periods of analyses for our dependent variable, e.g. the 
period 1970-1998.  
10 Eurostat and Cambridge Econometrics do provide data on Gross Fixed Capital Formation. However, data are 
incomplete for some countries or in time. 
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rates have increased since 1950, the 1977 information may be a reasonable proxy for the 
average over the entire period. Data on school enrolment rates in Spanish regions refer to 
1985.  
As is common in regional growth analyses we also include a measure to control for 
the level of welfare of neighbouring regions. Low initial income and large spillovers from 
other regions may stimulate growth by the convergence measure. Ideally one should use 
interregional input-output tables to calculate regional multipliers and construct a variable that 
controls for spatial correlation.11 However, this information was not available. In order to 
control for spatial correlation, we applied Quah’s (1996) approach and calculated the so-
called neighbour relative income. This method implies that we use average per capita income 
of the surrounding, physically contiguous regions to control for spatial auto-correlation. 
Hence, spillovers are measured as the average income of the regions adjacent to the focal 
region. In addition we use a measure for the concentration of human capital in 
agglomerations (created by the interaction of a dummy variable indicating the major 
agglomerations in a country and the school enrolment ratio).12 Regions in which large 
agglomerations are present may benefit from scale economics, concentration of human 
capital, the presence of a cluster of specialized suppliers, and a market with a critical mass of 
consumers (network externalities). 
 
Bridging social capital 
Following Knack and Keefer (1997), we measure bridging social capital by the density of 
associational activity, or in other words the average per capita membership of an association. 
Of the associations mentioned in the EVS data, we have used membership of the following 
                                                 
11 There exist other ways to have a more refined control variable that can be taken into consideration, for 
example the physical length of abutting boundaries or the physical characteristics of the border terrain. 
However, these kinds of extensions go beyond the scope of this paper. 
12  We selected the Western part of the Netherlands, Greater Paris, Greater Berlin, Greater London, Barcelona 
area, Brussels, and the Italian region Lazio (Rome) as major agglomerations. 
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groups: a) Religious or church organizations, b) Education, arts, music, cultural activities, c) 
Youth work (e.g. scouts, guides, youth clubs), d) Sports or recreation, and e) Women’s 
groups. The groups mentioned under a, b and c were also used by Knack and Keefer (1997) 
in their analysis. We have chosen to add d and e as they also proxy associational activity that 
is not focused on rent seeking activities that can be expected from groups such as political 
parties and professional associations.13 We expect the selected groups to involve social 
interaction that builds trust and cooperative habits, which is the reason why we label it 
bridging social capital. The average score of the density of group membership in 54 European 
regions equals .34 with a standard deviation of .18. The highest score (.80) is obtained in the 
eastern part of the Netherlands (Oost-Nederland), and the lowest score (.08) in the North-
Eastern part of Spain (Noroeste). All data are based on 1990 information. 
 
Bonding social capital and family ties 
We measure preferences for family ties (preference parameter φ in the model) by EVS data 
on the relative importance of the closed social circle.14 On a scale of 1-4 (very important – 
not at all important) respondents are asked to indicate the importance in their life of family, 
and friends and acquaintances. By using factor analysis we re-scaled the two items in one 
dimension reflecting bonding social capital. Both on the individual and the regional level the 
chosen items converge into one dimension. The regions where people attach the highest value 
to the close social circle can be found in the southern part of Europe. The region with the 
                                                 
13 Olson (1982) observed that associational activity may hurt growth because of rent-seeking activities. 
According to Olson, many of these associations may act as special interest groups lobbying for preferential 
policies that impose disproportionate costs on society. In this respect, Knack and Keefer (1997) distinguish 
between what they call Putnam and Olson groups. 
14 We have no measures of time spent in closed networks (bonding social capital). This means that we cannot 
test equation (13) of the model. In other words, we look at purely stated preference instead of revealed 
preference with respect to bonding social capital. Instead, for bridging capital we use a measure closer to a 
revealed preference indicator (actual network participation). 
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highest score on bonding social capital is the French Mediterranean and the region where 
people attach least importance to family and friends is the German region Bremen.  
 
Materialism  
To operationalise the degree of materialistic attitude towards society we use two proxies. 
First we use the well-known materialism-postmaterialism index introduced and developed by 
Inglehart (1997) and Inglehart and Baker (2000). It is based on the relative importance 
respondents attach to the following items: a) Maintaining order in the nation, b) Giving 
people more say in important government decisions, c) Fighting rising prices and d) 
Protecting freedom of speech. Of each of these four statements respondents are asked to 
indicate the most important and the next most important statement. The 
materialist/postmaterialist value is created as follows. If the respondent’s first and second 
choices are both materialist items (i.e. maintaining order and fighting rising prices), the score 
is ‘1’. If the respondent’s first and second choices are both postmaterialist items (i.e. giving 
people more say and protecting free speech), the score is ‘3’. If the two choices are any 
mixture of materialist and postmaterialist items, the score is ‘2’. In sum, a high score on this 
variable reflects a postmaterialistic attitude and a low score reflects a materialistic attitude. 
The mean score equals 2.04 with a maximum value of 2.29 in the region Berlin (Germany). 
The most materialistic according to Inglehart’s materialism index are the people in the Italian 
region Campania (1.68). 
In addition to Inglehart’s materialism measure, we use a second proxy. Our EVS 
dataset contains several questions on the importance people attach to various aspects of a job. 
Based on the question ‘which of the following aspects of a job you personally think are 
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important?’ respondents are asked to indicate a number of aspects.15 Among these aspects 
some refer to materialistic values (e.g. good pay) and others to immaterialistic values (e.g. 
useful job for society). We selected the following items that reflect an immaterialistic attitude 
towards a job: a) pleasant people to work with; b) a useful job for society; and c) meeting 
people. Using principal components analysis we re-scaled these items into one dimension and 
aggregated the individual scores to mean scores for each of our 54 regions. The variable is 
scaled from immaterialistic to materialistic. We choose to label this variable job-related 
materialism. Hence, high scores on the variable job related materialism reflect a materialistic 
attitude. The highest score (most materialistic) is obtained in the French region Sud-Ouest. 
The lowest score can be found in the eastern part of the Netherlands. Table 2 presents 
descriptive statistics of the variables defined above and used in the empirical tests. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev. 
Bonding social capital 





























                                                 
15 The total list of aspects respondents are asked to choose from is: good pay, pleasant people to work with, not 
too much pressure, good job security, good chances for promotion, a job respected by people in general, good 
hours, an opportunity to use initiative, a useful job for society, generous holidays, meeting people, a job in 
which you feel you can achieve something, a responsible job, a job that is interesting, a job that meets one’s 
abilities. 
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3.2 Testing our model 
Figure 1 depicts our testing strategy.  























Our aim is to test the model in figure 1. In particular, we are interested in the sign of 
the relationship between growth and bridging capital (proxied by group membership). Here 
we have to take into account that bridging social capital and growth are simultaneously 
determined. To avoid a simultaneity bias, we need to instrument for bridging social capital. 
Hence we use a two-stage least squares (2SLS) testing strategy.16 In the first stage, we 
instrument social capital, by regressing our measure of bridging capital on our measures of 
materialism, family ties and investment productivity. Doing so, we test for the signs of the 
arrows in the North-East part of the figure (and of equation (16)). In the second stage, we use 
instrumented bridging social capital, together with investment and convergence measures, as 
regressors for growth. Doing so we test for the signs of the left-hand side of the figure (and of 
                                                 
16 We have checked for a possible endogeneity bias by using a Hausman test. It is common to test whether it is 
necessary to use an instrumental variable and estimate a 2SLS regression, i.e., whether a set of estimates 
obtained by least squares is consistent or not. We performed an augmented regression and concluded that 






















equation (20) with (14) substituted). Needless to say, we are most interested in finding the 
empirically relevant sign of the relation between growth and bridging social capital which 
could not be determined a priori. 
The results are summarized in table 3. We estimate different models. The first is our 
basic model in which our dependent variable is the average regional-economic growth of per 
capita income between 1950 and 1998. In addition to the basic model we estimate a number 
of other model specifications.  
 
Table 3: IV-regression 
 
2nd Stage  Dependent variable:  regional economic growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 











Initial income -.92 (.16)** -.92 (.16)** -.92 (.16)** -.92 (.16)** -.84 (.18)** 
Schooling .49 (.34) .49 (.35) .50 (.35) .49 (.34) .43 (.35) 
Investment .33 (.23) .34 (.23) .33 (.24) .33 (.24) .35 (.24) 
Spillover .28 (.12)** .27 (.12)** .28 (.12)** .28 (.12)** .27 (.13)** 
Agglomeration .43 (.24)* .42 (.24)* .44 (.24)* .43 (.24)* .37 (.24) 
Bonding social capital -.37 (.23) -.36 (.23) -.39 (.22)* -.37 (.22) -.35 (.23) 
Bridging social capital .17 (.08)** .19 (.08)** .14 (.09) .17 (.08)** .15 (.08)* 
      
R-squared .53 .53 .53 .53 .45 
N 54 54 54 54 52 
 
1St Stage Dependent variable: bridging social capital 
Bonding social capital -.81 (.37)** -.63 (.38)* -1.02 (.43)** -.82 (.37)** -.81 (.38)** 
Job-related 
materialism 
-.63 (.27)** - -1.35 (.24)** -.57 (.29)** -.63 (.28)** 
Inglehart’s 
Postmaterialism 
2.53 (.60)** 3.42 (.49)** - 2.46 (.61)** 2.56 (.62)** 
Trust - - - .43 (.63) - 
      
R-squared .58 .54 .43 .59 .58 
N 54 54 54 54 52 
Standard errors between parentheses. * indicates 10% significance, ** indicates 5% significance. The basic equation refers to the growth 
period 1950-1998.  We only reported the variables of interest in the first stage and excluded the other exogenous variables. In model 5 we 
excluded the regions that have the maximum and minimum residual in the second stage of the regression. The regions we excluded are 
Schleswig-Holstein (Germany) and Nord Ovest (Italy). The regression in model 6 is based on the basic regression as shown in model 1. 
 
The basic model in column (1) shows that bridging social capital has a positive and 
significant effect on regional growth. Bonding social capital has the negative sign predicted 
by our model, but is insignificant in the second stage. However, in the first stage, bonding 
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social capital (or better, the preference for family ties) negatively affects bridging capital, a 
result in line with our model. Also materialism affects bridging capital negatively and 
significantly. The results on the effects of bridging capital on growth are worth being 
highlighted. Note that from the model we could not sign this effect unambiguously because 
of two opposing forces. Empirically, we find a positive effect, which means that bridging 
social capital is good for growth. This positive effect is statistically significant, but quite 
small in economic terms. A one percent standard deviation in bridging capital raises growth 
by only 0.170.18=0.03 percentage points. An assessment of the economic significance of the 
result that is more consistent with our estimation procedure yields a stronger effect: a one 
standard deviation change in our three instruments (family ties and two types of materialism) 
raises growth through bridging capital by 0.11 percentage points. Over our 48 years sample 
period this amounts to the non-negligible increase of 5.4% in (last year’s) regional income. 
The social capital variables in the basic model perform even better than the traditional 
variables like schooling and investment, of which the coefficient is insignificant. While 
schooling is often a problematic variable in growth regressions (Krueger and Lindahl, 2001), 
investment usually is a robust variable (Levine and Renelt, 1991). Note however, that we 
included national rather than regional investment rates.  
Model (2) shows the results when the variable Job related materialism is left out. 
Compared with the basic model this does not yield different results. Leaving out Inglehart’s 
materialism index does however yield different results. As model (3) shows, bridging social 
capital is not significantly positively related to growth as it is in all the other models. The 
overall fit of the 1st stage model goes considerably down from .58 in model (1) to .43, 
suggesting it is important to include Inglehart’s materialism index in the 1st stage. 
Adding trust as an instrument to the first stage regression does not yield differences 
with the basic model. As shown by Beugelsdijk et al. (2004), the significance of trust in 
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growth regressions depends on the inclusion of a number of less developed countries. Given 
the European sample, the insignificant result is therefore not surprising (Beugelsdijk and Van 
Schaik, 2005). The results in table 3 suggest that trust is not indirectly related to growth 
either. The relation between trust and bridging social capital is not significant when we use 
trust as an instrument for bridging social capital. In case we add trust as an instrument and 
exclude the other instruments the above conclusion does not change. 
In our final model we test if outliers determine the results obtained. We have left out 
the regions that had the highest and lowest residual in the second stage of our basic regression 
model (1). The regions excluded are Schleswig-Holstein (Germany) and Nord Ovest (Italy). 
The analysis for the reduced sample of 52 regions does not differ greatly of the results 
obtained in the basic regression on 54 regions. The main difference can be found in the fact 
that bridging social capital is not related to growth at the 5% significance level, but at 10% 
(though the reduction in significance is marginal, namely 6% versus 4%). We also excluded 
the observations with maximum and minimum value of growth (Bayern in Germany, resp. 
Nord Ovest in Northern Italy) and the maximum and minimum value for initial income 
(Hamburg, resp. South Italy). Thirdly, we used a so-called recursive method to check of the 
composition of the sample influenced our results. All these checks suggest that our results are 
robust with respect to the potential influence of outliers. Finally we have tested for alternative 
growth periods. Results (not shown, but available upon request) do not change our conclusion 
regarding the economic effects of the two types of social capital. 
 
4. Conclusion  
In this paper we have distinguished between bonding and bridging social capital. We have 
developed a model to formalize the link between these two types of social capital and 
economic growth and empirically tested our hypotheses. We identified two channels through 
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which social capital and economic growth are interrelated. First, network participation is a 
time-consuming process, which crowds out working and learning time and therefore tends to 
be negatively correlated with growth. Second, participation in networks that span different 
communities may create bridging social capital. Trust is generated in these networks, which 
protects members against rent-seeking activities. The reason is that participants that know 
each other from the same network restrain their opportunistic behavior towards each other, to 
maintain reputation within the group and to avoid ostracism or lighter forms of punishment.  
By this second channel, the relationship between growth and social capital tends to be 
positive. Such a positive relationship does not exist for bonding social capital and economic 
growth. Bonding social capital arises from networking within own communities of close 
friends and family. Because opportunistic behavior is limited in one’s own closed social 
circle, an increase in time spent with your own close circle does not reduce opportunistic 
behavior in the economy. Higher levels of bonding social capital are therefore likely to go 
together with lower rates of economic growth, since spending more time with family and 
close friends comes at the cost of working and learning time. Our empirical analysis of 
growth in 54 European regions confirms the importance of the distinction between these two 
kinds of social capital. Bridging social capital is empirically good for growth, while a large 
importance attached to family ties is negatively related to growth (though indirectly).  
We have also stressed the fact that social capital is a choice variable that has to be 
explained from deeper economic and cultural variables. A central variable in our analysis is 
materialism. In our sample of European regions, we find that more importance attached to 
material possession is correlated with lower participation in voluntary organizations, which 
results in lower growth through reduced levels of bridging social capital. Apart from 
generating explicit results on social values and economic performance, our two-stage 
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approach also allowed us to address the simultaneity problems of which other studies have 
been criticized (Durlauf, 2002b).  
Our first step in modelling and estimating the growth effect of bonding versus 
bridging capital calls for several next steps. First, an analysis of data on actual time spent 
with family and friends could make the role of bonding social capital more explicit. Also, by 
exploiting data on rent-seeking and corruption, we could try to measure our protection against 
rent-seeking effect directly. Unfortunately, this type of data on the regional level in Europe is 
hard to find. Second, better empirical results might be obtained if we no longer classify 
networks uniquely as either bonding or bridging. For example, we used the working 
hypothesis that membership of a sports club results into bridging social capital, but a soccer 
club can be rather bonding if all team players are from the same social class and district. 
Alternatively, family ties can be of a bridging character. Third, we may try to find a broader 
spectrum of variables, beyond materialistic values, that drive the choice between bonding and 
bridging social capital. The relative amount of bridging versus bonding may be a reflection of 
broader cultural values, of which materialism is an important component (Inglehart and 
Baker, 2000). Finally, the theoretical modeling can be refined, for example by explicitly 
modeling the microeconomics of reputation, opportunistic behaviour and efficiency losses 
from cheating. We are convinced that general equilibrium modelling with micro-economic 
foundation can further our insights in the link between social values and economic 
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Appendix I: 
One assumption in our model concerns the negative relation between time invested in social 
interaction and working time. To substantiate this assumption, the following table shows at 
the country level the average number of hours worked and the amount of bridging social 
capital. The correlation is negative (-.34) for the sample of 20 countries for which we have 
data. Acknowledging the extraordinary position of the United States regarding its relative 
dense network membership of church and religious associations (Inglehart and Baker, 2000), 
excluding the United States yields a correlation of -.47. All in all this negative correlation 








Austria 1.00 1,683 
Belgium 1.21 1,699 
Canada 1.46 1,830 
Denmark 1.05 1,492 
Finland 1.30 1,677 
France 0.46 1,558 
Germany 0.65 1,541 
Greece 0.88 1,912 
Iceland 1.70 1,839 
Ireland 0.87 1,922 
Italy 0.58 1,674 
Japan 0.62 1,956 
Luxem 1.17 1,638 
Nether- 2.49 1,414 
Portugal 0.26 1,882 
Spain 0.38 1,824 
Sweden 2.10 1,546 
Turkey 0.04 1,912 
U.K. 0.43 1,698 
USA 2.43 1,840 
Correlation   
Full sample -0.335 N=20 
excl USA -0.472 N=19 
Source: Data on working hours are from the Groningen Growth and Development Center 
(www.ggdc.net). The social capital measure is based on the measure as developed by Knack 
and Keefer (1997) and fully described in the empirical section of this paper. Social capital 
data is based on the World Values Survey. Both working hours and social capital refer to 
1990 data. 
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Appendix II: Comparative statics and stability 
We linearize the first order conditions and the budget constraint. Using the first order 
condition for future consumption (8) to eliminate co (i.e. after substituting oc c=  , since r is a 
constant), and using the symmetry assumption, see (10) and (11), we find for the budget 
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(1 )(1 ) 0
1
zB zvvv ff zz ll v B v z
v B
 − ψ − ψ + + + + − + ζ + =  −  
      FOCl (A.5) 
 
where variables with a tilde are logarithmic deviations from the initial equilibrium; variables 
without a tilde refer to the initial equilibrium, /Sf fS f Sε = , and σcs is the elasticity of 
substitution between s, c, and c0 in U (σcs=1 in (1)).  
We first consider the properties of the model if all variables are non-zero, postponing corner 
solutions and stability to below. Combining (A.4) and (A.3), we find: 
 
Zvz v+= −ε  ,        (A.6) 
Fvf v= ε + φ  ,        (A.7) 
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where ijε  denotes the elasticity of i with respect to j, and ij+ε  denotes the positively defined 











,  1 1
1Fv vf Bz Zv
B
B +
ζε = + σ ε ε >
− ζ
. 
 / 0Bz zB z Bε = > ,   /Sf fS f Sε = . 
 
Equations (A.6) and (A.7) give the properties (elasticities) of the functions Z and F in (12) 
and (13). Substituting (A.6) and (A.7) into (A.1), (A.2), and (A.5), respectively, we find: 
 
( )(1 )
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
Tv
Fv Zv Bz Zv
w wl fw
c v f z v v B v l w
c c c+ +
≡ε
   
 = − − ε + ε + + − ε ε ζ − − φ +	 
 	 
 + δ + δ + δ   














 σ − σ ζ= + ε ε ε σ + − ε σ + ε φ + µ + σ	 
	 
 	 
− ζ σ −   
   

.   (A.9) 
 
( )1 1(1 ) (1 )
Lv
Fv Zv Bz Zv
f
l v f z v v B v
l l l+ +
≡ε
 
 = − − ε + ε + + − ε ε + ζ − φ + ψ	 
  ψ 
  

,  (A.10) 
 
Equation (A.10) is the log-linear equivalent of (14) in the main text; it is used to determine 
the partial derivatives of the function L. To simplify, and consistent with (1), from now on we 








  −= ε φ + µ + ψ 	 
ε + δ ψ  
   ,      (A.11) 
 






     ε ε ε − ε
= − ε + φ − µ + ψ	 
 	 
 	 
ε ε ε ψ     
   .    (A.12) 
where 
 1 (1 ) [ (1 ) ]





 ε = + ε ε ε σ + − ε + + − ε ε − ζ + δ
 > 0. 
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Note that (A.11) is the linearized version of (16) in the main text. Increases in ,  and φ  
raise equilibrium bridging capital v, see (A.11). Since the sign of Lvε  is ambiguous, the effect 
of changes in  and φ  on equilibrium learning time l is ambiguous, see (A.12). Since it can 
be proved that Cv Tvε ε>  (see below), an increase in  increases l.  
 
Proof  Cv Tvε ε> . 
Now consider possible corner solutions. The CES formulations of the (sub)utility function 
implies that , , ,oc c v f  are all strictly positive, and the first-order conditions hold with 
equality. We combine the asociated first-order conditions and budget constraint, (A.1), (A.2), 
and (A.3), to derive the following expression (for 1csσ = ): 
 
[ ] [ ]11 (1 )
(1 ) (1 )
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          (A.13) 
The marginal benefits of an increase in z are (1 ) zv B w−  (LHS of (5)), while the marginal 














        (A.14) 
 
An interior solution requires that (A.13) and (A.14) hold with equality. The second order 
condition for this equilibrium requires that when z is slightly lower than in the equilibrium, 
and when all other variables are adjusted such that the FOCs for , , ,oc c v f  still hold, the 
marginal benefits of z should exceed the marginal costs. In other words, if we draw (A.13) 
and (A.14) in a z,v plane, the locus corresponding to (A.13) should cut the locus 
corresponding to (A.14) from below for the equilibrium to be “stable” (second order 
condition fulfilled). From (A.13) and (A.14), this requires Cv Tvε ε> , where Cvε  and Tvε  are 
defined in (A.8) and (A.9).  
If z = 0, we have, from the definitions, (1 ) /(1 ) 0Cv Tv l w cε ε δ− = − + > , ( ) / 0Lv v f lε = − + < . 
